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Abstract
This paper develops a model with endogenously coarse rules. A principal hires
an agent to take an action. The principal knows the optimal state-contingent action,
but cannot communicate it perfectly due to communication constraints. The princi-
pal can use previously realized states as examples to define rules of varying breadth.
We analyze how rules are chosen under several assumptions about how rules can be
amended. We explore the inefficiencies that arise and how they depend on the ability
to refine rules, the principal’s time horizon and patience, and other factors. Our
model exhibits path dependence in that the efficacy of rule development depends on
the sequence of realizations of the state. We interpret this as providing a foundation
for persistent performance differences between similar organizations and explore the
role of different delegation structures in ameliorating the effects of bounded commu-
nication.
∗Ellison: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, E52-380a, 50 Memorial
Drive, Cambridge MA 02142. E-mail: gellison@mit.edu. Holden: School of Economics, Australian School
of Business, University of New South Wales. E-mail: richard.holden@unsw.edu. This work was supported
by MIT Sloan’s Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations and NSF grant SES-0550897. We
are deeply indebted to Bob Gibbons for numerous discussions and suggestions. We also thank the editor
Wouter Dessein, two anonymous referees, Oliver Hart, Bengt Holmstrom, Andrei Shleifer, Andy Skrzypacz,
Oliver Williamson, and seminar participants at Columbia, Chicago GSB, Harvard, MIT, UC Berkeley and
UCLA for helpful comments.
1
1 Introduction
Firms and bureaucracies cannot function without rules. These rules lead them to take
inefficient decisions in some circumstances. One long-recognized reason why rules will be
inefficient is that the world is so complex that it would be impossible to list what is optimal
in every contingency. In this paper, we develop a model to explore the economics of second-
best rulemaking in such an environment. Our model does not have a traditional “agency
problem” involving incentives and private benefits: we assume that the agent follows any
rules that are set out for him. Instead, the problem that our principal faces is one of
communication: the language in which rules must be expressed is not sufficiently rich as
to allow the first-best contingent plan to be described. The way in which we do this is the
most novel aspect of our framework: we assume that the principal can convey analogy-
based rules dictating that a given action be taken in states similar to previously-realized
states. We examine the economics of second-best rule-making and discuss the inefficiencies
that arise and how they are related to various assumptions about the environment.
One application we have in mind for our model is rulemaking in organizations. Here, our
motivation is that many businesses have central decisionmakers who have developed a deep
understanding of what is optimal for the firm. For example, an experienced venture capi-
talist knows a great deal about which ventures should be financed, the central management
of a retail chain knows a great deal about how a store should operate, and an experienced
human relations director has expertise in judging whether a given job applicant is likely
to be a valuable employee. Central decisionmakers are also very busy and hence delegate
tasks to agents: younger associates do background research on venture capital proposals;
store managers are hired to run individual stores; and less experienced staff review many
job applications. Some things that the central decision-makers know can easily be written
down in a manual, e.g. “always include in your report a complete list of other ventures that
the entrepreneur has been involved with in the past ten years” and “always issue refunds
to customers who have a receipt for a purchase within the past 30 days.” But there will be
a great deal of residual expertise that cannot be so easily codified: one cannot describe the
full set of proposals that might come in and what issues should be investigated on each one;
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or the full set of people who might apply for a job and what questions you should ask each
one; or all customer complaints that a store manager might encounter. Our primary focus
is on how organizations develop less formal rules to capture the benefits of this residual
expertise.
We feel that an important way in which nuanced rules are conveyed in the real-world
is via analogy-based rules. For example, the VC analyst might be told later on that the
firm might have made a better decision if his report on Entrepreneur X’s proposal
had contained Information Y and he should include such information on any similar
proposals; the store manager could be told that Mayor X should have immediately been
given a refund even though he didn’t have a receipt and the same rule applies to anyone
at all like the mayor; and an HR employee could be told that hiring Person X seems to
have been a mistake and he should be wary of very similar candidates. Each new shared
experience provides an opportunity to promulgate such rules. There is some scope to decide
how broad or narrow to make each such rule. The efficiency of rule systems should improve
over time as shared experience accumulates.
A second application we have in mind is to the interpretations of laws by common-
law courts. Here, the principal would be the Supreme Court or some other higher-level
court and the agents would be the lower-level courts that adjudicate each case. Much of
what a law dictates is readily apparent from the text of the statute. But again there will
be “residual expertise”: there will be cases for which the interpretation of the statute is
not as clear and the higher level court will have views about how each such case should
be decided. The way in which this expertise gets reflected in lower court decisions is by
legal precedent: the higher-level court agrees to hear some cases and its decisions in those
cases become rules which lower-level courts will apply to similar cases in the future. These
precedents are like the analogies mentioned above in that they exploit shared experiences
and in that higher-level courts will have some scope to indicate whether each new precedent
is broad or narrow. The accumulated set of precedents becomes more complete and lower
court decisions come close to the higher court’s preferred interpretation as the case law
accumulates.
The cognitive assumptions we make are comprised of two components. First, there is
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bounded communication, so the the Principal is unable to immediately communicate the
mapping from states of the world to optimal actions. Second, the agent suffers a recognition
problem.1 The agent must have experienced a state herself (or a nearby state) before the
Principal can promulgate a rule relating to it. The former assumption is somewhat familiar
in economics, as we discuss below in relating our paper to the literature on endogenous
communication problems in organizations. The recognition problem is less familiar in
economic models, however it relates to a large literature in cognitive psychology.
Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that much decisionmaking takes place by
learning from particular experiences and then relating new situations to those experiences.
Further, they typically claim that decisionmakers are ineffective when they lack experience.
As Simon (1990) puts it “Recognition processes have been shown to play a major, perhaps
the major role, in such diverse tasks as grandmaster chessplaying, medical diagnosis, and
reading.” Moreover, for Simon, people become expert decisionmakers only by building
up a “production system” over time, comprised of stored cues and associated knowledge.
Decisions are made by relating a current problem to a stored cue.
The recognition problem also relates to the literature on “experiential learning,” which
in some sense dates to Aristotle who observed “For the things we have to learn before
we can do them, we learn by doing them.” Proponents of experiential learning (such as
David Kolb, Kurt Lewin, John Dewey and Jean Piaget) emphasize “concrete experience”
versus “abstract conceptualization”. Such authors often emphasize that at early stages of
development, learning occurs almost exclusively through concrete experience.
We describe our model formally at the start of Section 2. There are two players: a
principal and an agent. There is a discrete set of time periods. In each period a new state
of the world arises. The agent observes the state and must take an action. Inefficient
decisions are sometimes taken not because of any incentive issues, but because of one of
our communication constraints: the agent must act before he can communicate with the
principal (and has no prior knowledge of the mapping from states to optimal actions). We
assume that the agent will always follow any rule that has been communicated to him, but
these will typically be incomplete and/or suboptimal because of our other communication
constraint: the principal is restricted to the use of analogy-based rules specifying that an
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action be taken whenever the new state is within some distance of a previously realized
state. The principal does observe the state and has an opportunity to promulgate new rules
at the end of each period, so rulebooks will become more complex and efficient over time.
One other consideration that turns out to be important is the extent to which rules can
be changed over time. Different assumptions may be appropriate for different applications,
so we discuss three variants of the model. We call these the no overwriting, incremental
overwriting and vast overwriting cases.
Section 3 discusses the simplest case in which rules exist: a two period model in which
a rule for second-period behavior can make reference to the first-period state. A basic
economic observation is that decisions about the breadth of a rule will reflect the rule’s
average value in the marginal cases. Hence, except in special cases optimal rules will
have “excess breadth” in that they are designed to sometimes produce incorrect decisions.
Indeed, at the margin the first-period rule is completely worthless and must produce as
many incorrect decisions as correct decisions.
Section 4 examines a three period model. A primary observation here is that in dynamic
settings option-value considerations create a “starting small” incentive that counteracts the
incentive noted above: narrow rules have the benefit of giving the principal more freedom
to exploit future rulemaking opportunities. In the no overwriting case, the option-value
consideration may dominate to the extent that the principal declines to expand the breadth
of a rule even though it would also be correct in all marginal cases.
Section 5 examines the infinite-horizon case. Although rule books may grow ever more
complicated, we note that they can be seen as converging if one thinks about them in
terms of the expected payoff they produce. These limiting payoffs depend on historical
accident: the firm achieves a better long-run payoff if early realizations of the state are
ones that lead to efficient analogy-based rules. We suggest that this might be a source
of persistent performance differences among seemingly similar firms. Firms will always
develop nearly optimal rules if the principal is very patient. Whether exactly optimal rules
develop depends on the assumptions about how rules can be revised.
Section 6 builds on the model to discuss governance structures in firms and how they
may evolve. There are now two tasks, the principal has access to two agents, and can also
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perform a task himself. Time constraints force the principal to choose between delegating
both tasks with communication, or performing one task personally and delegating the other
without communication. Section 7 concludes.
Our paper relates to a number of literatures. Most closely related is the literature on
languages and communication within organizations. Arrow (1974, 1984) introduced the
notion of a code in an organization as “all the known ways, whether or not inscribed in
formal rules, for conveying information.” He focuses on the effect of codes on returns to
scale, and on the irreversible nature of the investment in developing a code. Wernerfelt
(2004) analyzes a team-theoretic problem in which agents may use different codes in com-
municating with a principal in order to optimally deploy an indivisible asset. Cremer et al.
(2007) analyze a model with boundedly rational agents where a common language reduces
the cost of irrationality, but comes at the expense of being narrowly tailored to the state of
the world. They explore the implications of this tradeoff for optimal scope of organizations.
Also closely related is the literature on categorization and coarse decision making. Pa-
pers in this literature endogenize the coarseness of plans and/or examine implications of
this coarseness. MacLeod (2002) is perhaps most similar to our paper in that its model
involves organizations making state-contingent plans that will be implemented when a ran-
dom state arises. It endogenizes incompleteness via per-state planning costs and examines
learning curves in a dynamic model. Other notable papers endogenizing the coarseness of
categorizations include Samuelson (2001), which examines a model in which players make
analogies across games to economize on cognitive costs which are modeled using automata,
and Al-Najjar and Pai (2009), which develops a model in which coarse categorical mod-
els can be preferred when more refined models will over-fit limited data. Another set of
interesting recent papers, including Mullainathan (2002), Fryer and Jackson (2007), and
Mullainathan et al. (2008), focuses more on the types of problems that arise when agents
use a limited number of categories. Relative to this literature, one can think of our paper as
developing an alternate framework for studying endogenous coarseness – restricting agents
to using distance based rules with breadth as a choice variable – and examining problems
motivated by organizational decision-making.
More broadly, there is a long history of studying adaptation in organizations dating
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back to Knight (1921), Barnard (1938), and Hayek (1945). Williamson (2005) argues
that “adaptation to disturbances [is] the central problem of economic organization”. The
largest part of the formal literature examines the principal-agent relationship from incentive
theory perspective2. Our paper, in contrast, is more similar to the “team theory” approach
pioneered by Marschak and Radner (1972) and including such subsequent contributions
as Cremer (1980), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Wernerfelt (1997), Van Zandt (1999),
and Vayanos (2003). We follow this literature in focusing on models in which there is no
divergence in preferences between principals and agents. Instead, the fundamental obstacles
to efficient organizations are the costs of information processing and communication. Our
focus is somewhat different from the much of this literature: whereas many papers in this
literature assume a reduced form “cost” of communication and focus on how organizations
should be structured to minimize these costs, we spend most of our time characterizing the
“costs” that result from the limitations we place on what can and cannot be communicated;
and we only get to organizational implications in one section near the end.
Our paper also relates to other literatures that endogenize communication problems in
organizations. A large literature following Crawford and Sobel (1982) examines limitations
on communication using cheap-talk models. Dessein (2002) notes that such limitations
provide a motivation to delegate decisions to agents. Two more recent papers focus more
directly on endogenizing communication costs. Dessein and Santos (2006) analyzes the
tradeoffs between adaptation to changing environments and coordination across agents
when communication is imperfect. It emphasizes that communication is difficult and in-
cludes an extension analyzing the quality of communication in a model in which communi-
cation can be made more accurate at a cost. Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) focuses more
directly on endogenizing the limited quality of communication and develop several models
featuring differences in preferences, effort costs in the sending and receiving of messages,
and various assumptions about the structure of actions. What we are doing is somewhat
different from this literature in that we do not have preference differences and focus on
the issue of communicating the desired contingent plan-of-action, whereas much of this
literature abstracts from this part of the communication problem and simply assumes, for
example, that the optimal plan is to set the action “equal” to the signal the agent receives.
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There is also an experimental literature on communication in organizations. Most
closely related to our paper are Camerer and Weber (2003) and Selten and Warglien (2006).
Camerer and Weber (2003) run an experiment involving 16 pictures depicting offices in
which subjects can use natural language to try to tell each other which picture is relevant
in this round. They are interested in the development of codes over time and in how two
“firms” with different codes perform when merged. Selten and Warglien (2006) use abstract
shapes instead of office pictures, and the available language consists of a few different letters,
each with its own cost. The performance-improvements on these tasks are an example of
organizational “learning by doing”.
We would also cite one piece of potentially relevant empirical evidence. Kellogg (2008)
examines the experience of oil production companies and drilling contractors and finds evi-
dence that producer-driller pairs become more efficient over the course of their relationship.
A source of these economies may be that shared experience lets the producer describe mea-
sures that should be undertaken in particular circumstances to avoid problems that have
occurred in the past.
2 The Model
In this section we describe our model formally and discuss motivations for several of the
assumptions.
2.1 Statement of the Problem
Our model has two players: the Principal and the Agent. The Principal hires the Agent to
react to idiosyncratic situations and take actions on her behalf in each period t = 1, ..., T .
At the start of each period, the principal issues a set of rules Rt. The Agent then observes
the state of nature ωt ∈ Ω and chooses an action at ∈ {−1, 1}. The principal then receives
a payoff pi(at, ωt) that depends on A’s action and the state of nature. The principal’s payoff
in the full game is the discounted sum of her per period payoffs: V =
∑T
t=1 δ
tpi(at, ωt). We
will sometimes write Vt ≡ pi(at, ωt) for the principal’s payoff in period t.
The first best would obtain if the principal at each time t issued rules instructing the
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principal
sets rules
Rt ∈ <t
Agent
observes ωt
chooses at
principal
receives pi(at, ωt)
observes ωt
Period t
principal
sets rules
Rt+1 ∈ <t+1
Figure 1: Model timing
agent to choose at ∈ Argmaxapi(a, ωt). Constraints we impose on the communication,
however, will make this impossible.
A central element of our model is that we assume the existence of a commonly un-
derstood distance function ‖‖ defined on Ω. This distance function makes it possible to
define analogy-based rules. A rule r is a quadruple r = (ω, d, a, p). This is interpreted as
prescribing that action a should be chosen in period t if ‖ωt−ω‖ < d. The extra parameter
p assigns a priority to each rule: when multiple rules apply the higher priority rule is to be
followed. We will sometimes write ω(r), d(r), a(r), and p(r) for the functions giving the
relevant component of the rule r. A rule book R is a finite set of rules with a well defined
precedence order: r, r′ ∈ R =⇒ p(r) 6= p(r′).
We model the Agent as mechanically implementing whatever rule book he is given. If
no rules apply the Agent is assumed to choose an action at random with both actions
being equally likely. To express formally the assumptions about how agents act, write
D(R) for the set of states covered by at least one rule, D(R) = {ω′ ∈ Ω | ‖ω′ − ω‖ <
d for some (ω, d, a, p) ∈ R}. Our assumption is that when rule book Rt has been commu-
nicated to the agent and state ωt is then observed the agent’s action choice is
at =
{
a if (ω, d, a, p) ∈ Rt, ‖ωt − ω‖ < d, and p = max{r∈Rt|ωt∈D({r})} p(r)
1
2
· −1 + 1
2
· 1 if ωt 6∈ D(Rt).
We impose limits on communication both by restricting the principal to choose rule
books as defined above and by imposing additional restrictions on the set <t of feasible
rule books.
First, we incorporate the notion that rules must be analogy-based by assuming through-
out the paper that rules must be based on previous observations and that at most one rule
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may be based on any past observation:
r ∈ Rt ∈ <t =⇒ ω(r) = ωt′ for some t′ < t
r, r′ ∈ Rt ∈ <t =⇒ ω(r) 6= ω(r′).
Second, we incorporate the notion that changing rules can be difficult by imposing
restrictions on how rule books are changed over time. We vary these in different sections
of the paper. We consider three variants.
1. No Overwriting. The only feasible change to the rule book is to add a single rule that
references the most recent state and applies to a previously uncovered domain, i.e.
Rt ∈ <t =⇒ Rt = Rt−1∪{r} for some rule r with ω(r) = ωt−1 and D({r})∩D(Rt−1) =
∅.
2. Incremental Overwriting. Once again the feasible changes are to add a single rule
that references the most recent state. In this specification, however, the new rule is
allowed to overlap with one or more previous rules and takes precedence if the rules
conflict, i.e. Rt ∈ <t =⇒ Rt = Rt−1 ∪ {r} for some rule r with ω(r) = ωt−1 and
p(r) > p(r′) for all r′ ∈ Rt−1.
3. Vast Overwriting. In this specification there is no additional restriction on Rt. The
principal can design an entirely new rule book in each period.
Most of our analyses will discuss what happens in simple special cases of our model:
we assume the state space is a circle and that states are independent draws from a uniform
distribution on this set. Mathematically, this corresponds to setting Ω = [0, 1] and defining
distances by ‖x − y‖ = min{|x − y|, 1 − |x − y|}. We write f(ω) for the payoff gain/loss
from implementing action 1 at ω rather than letting the Agent choose randomly,
f(ω) = pi(1, ω)−
(
1
2
pi(1, ω) +
1
2
pi(−1, ω)
)
.
We assume that f(ω) is continuous which requires that f(0) = f(1). We extend f to a
periodic function on R by setting f(x) = f(x− bxc) to make some calculations easier. To
rule out a trivial case where rule-making is extremely easy or irrelevant, we also assume that
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f takes on both positive and negative values. The Principal’s optimal strategy is unaffected
if we change payoffs in any way that leaves f(ω) unaffected, so we will also normalize payoffs
by assuming that pi(−1, ω)+pi(1, ω) = 0 for all all ω. With this assumption, the Principal’s
payoff is V =
∑T
t=1 δ
tatf(ωt).
2.2 Motivation
We intend for the model to capture applications for which Ω is sufficiently complex so that
communicating the first-best contingent plan is an impossibility. In the case of a venture
capital firm giving instructions to a new associate, for example, the set Ω would be the set
of all possible business proposals that the employee might get to review and the first-best
contingent plan would be a list describing all possible proposals and instructing him as to
what he should tell upper management in his analysis of each proposal. In the case of a
firm giving instructions to a new human resources employee the set Ω would be the set of
all possible employees who might interview for a job. In the legal application Ω would be
the set of all cases that might come before a lower court.
What does happen in such settings? Obviously, some basic rules can easily be commu-
nicated to the Agent before any shared experience exists. For example, the human relations
employee can easily be told that a candidate without a bachelor’s degree or one with an
undergraduate GPA below 2.8 should not be hired. Our model is not about these rules.
Instead, we are interested capturing that Principals in these examples (the experienced HR
manager, the head of the venture capital firm, the higher court judges) know much more
than can be stated so simply and would like to communicate this to their Agents so that
they can more closely approximate the much more nuanced decisions that the Principal
would take if she were personally performing the Agent’s job.
We focus on analogy-based rules because we feel that this is descriptively a good model
of how knowledge is often communicated in real-world organizations. While it is hard to
describe people in the abstract, it is easy to use a particular person that Principal and
Agent both know as an example of someone who should or should not have been employed.
Moreover, we feel that it is also descriptively accurate that people have an innate sense of
“distance” that they can apply at least approximately even in complex spaces. For example,
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one can say that John Kerry is more similar to Mike Dukakis than is John Edwards. While
distances are not conveyed numerically in real-world analogies, we feel that substantial
information about desired distances is often conveyed by one of two methods: rules can
be conveyed either by using distance words (“don’t nominate anyone who is at all like
Mike Dukakis”) or by using lists of people who are separated by some distance in order
to implicitly define the breadth of the analogy (“don’t let people invite themselves to give
the theory seminar unless it’s someone like Paul Milgrom or Eric Maskin”). In the legal
application, the case under consideration in the precedent-setting decision serves as the
base case for the analogy and the language in the higher-level court decision helps convey
how broadly the precedent is to apply.
Our additional restrictions on how rules change over time are designed to reflect dif-
ficulties inherent in promulgating and communicating rules. “Vast overwriting” might be
appropriate for organizations in which a single principal and agent interact and in which
the principal has the time to explain to the agent that they are throwing out all of their old
rules and starting from scratch with a new way of thinking about the job. “Incremental
overwriting” prevents principals from revising existing rules and limits them to making
one new rule per period. Retracting rules might be problematic in some applications. For
example, if rules diffuse through a multi-agent organization via a word-of-mouth process
then it may be hard for agents who hear different versions of the same rule to know which
version of a rule is the current version. “No overwriting” additionally rules out priority
systems. This may be appropriate in situations where agents are less sophisticated and
could get confused if multiple rules were applicable, or if agents follow the first applicable
rule they think of. In the legal application there is a longstanding tradition that cases
that have already been decided are “settled law” which should not be contradicted by new
decisions except in very unusual circumstances. This could make the no overwriting model
most appropriate.
2.3 An aside on our modeling choices: A fully rational variant
Note that in our model specification we made assumptions directly on the agent’s behavior
– essentially making him a robot who literally follow instructions – rather than giving him
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a utility function and making him a rational player in a game theoretic model. We have
two motivations for this approach. First, we think that what we have done captures well
how agents would behave in many applications. Second, what we have done is simpler.
Appropriately rationalizing the model is more complicated than one might guess at
first because many rational models would have the property that more communication
than seems reasonable can occur in equilibrium. The “unreasonable” equilibria exploit
a dubious feature of traditional solution concepts – agents behave as if they know the
equilibrium strategies of the other players. For instance, if we assume that the agent is
rational with the same preferences as the principal, then the first-best can be obtained
in a sequential equilibrium by having the principal promulgate an initial rule that is not
meant to be interpreted literally, but which instead encodes the principal’s full knowledge
of the function f in a manner that the agent implicitly knows and best-replies to. We
demonstrate this formally, and make some further remarks, in the appendix.
2.4 Another aside on our modeling choices: Asymmetric analo-
gies and random choices
In this second aside we discuss the motivation for two other assumptions: our restriction
to “symmetric” analogies and our assumption that agents choose randomly when no rule
has been defined. It is another conscious part of our modeling strategy – we see it as the
simplest way to create the kind of accuracy versus breadth tradeoff that will arise in any
complex state space – and are happy with it even though we could have avoided the obvious
critiques of these assumptions via other means.
The symmetry restriction is that we have assumed the principal can issue only rules that
apply when ‖ωt− ω‖ < d rather than allowing rules that apply when ωt ∈ [ω− d1, ω+ d2].
Many readers will no doubt quickly think of a two-step critique. First, asymmetric rules
are used in practice, e.g. an admissions committee member could be told that students like
Student X should be accepted only if their technical background is as strong or stronger.
Second, allowing asymmetric rules would have a dramatic effect in some situations. For
example, when f is as pictured in Figure 3 and ω1 =
3
8
, a Principal restricted to symmetric
rules will be forced to define a highly inefficient rule, whereas a Principal who could explain
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that action 1 should be taken if the action is within 3
8
of ω1 on the left or within
1
8
on the
right would be able to perfectly describe where action 1 should be taken.
We agree with both steps, but still feel that our symmetry assumption is a very good
one. Recall that our motivation for considering analogy-based rules is that the world is
sufficiently complex so as to make it impossible to describe the sets of states in which each
action is optimal. In such environments it is natural that all feasible rules will only crudely
approximate the first-best. For example, if the set of states in which action 1 is optimal
were the irregular-shaped region in R2 shown in Figure 2, then the best feasible rule would
be inaccurate regardless of whether the agent could issue rules to apply on squares, or
rectangles, and regardless of whether these had to be symmetrically centered on the point
in question. We could have written this paper using a two-dimensional model without the
symmetry restriction. Several of our propositions (including 1, 5, and 6) could be easily
modified to apply in such an environment and examples could have been constructed to
convey other points.
However, we feel that our simple one-dimensional model with the symmetry restriction
captures the same breadth versus accuracy tradeoffs and provides a neater way to convey
our insights.
u
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppp p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p ppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p ppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p pp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppp p p p p p ppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppppp p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppp
pppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p ppppppppppp
u
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppp p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p ppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p ppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p pp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppp p p p p p ppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppppp p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppp
pppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p ppppppppppp
u
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppp p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p ppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p ppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppp p p p p pp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp
pppppppppppppp p p p p p ppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppppp p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppp
pppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppppppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p p pppppppp
pppppppppppp p p p p p p p p p p ppppppppppp
Figure 2: A higher-dimensional example
Similarly, some readers may wonder about our assumption that the agent chooses his
action randomly if a state occurs for which no rule has been defined. Why don’t we let the
14
Principal decree that a particular action should be the default if no other rule applies?3
Again, our answer is that yes, principals could often do this in practice, and yes it would
allow the Principal of our model to do substantially better in some examples, but we don’t
want to allow it because its only real effect would be to force us to come up with more
complicated examples to illustrate some of the things we want to illustrate.
3 Two Periods: A Simple Theory of Intentionally In-
accurate Rules
In this section we discuss the two-period version of our model. The two-period version is
simple and brings out some basic economics about the design of rules.
In the first period of our model, there is nothing for the principal to do and her expected
payoff is always zero. In the second period, the principal can take advantage of the common
reference point ω1 to define a rule R2 that will result in a higher expected payoff. All three
versions of our model are identical: the principal chooses a single rule (ω1, d, a).
3.1 Endogenous inaccuracy
The following proposition shows that rules are designed to have “excess breadth” in the
sense that they are intentionally made to cover a broader domain than the domain on which
they produce only correct decisions.
We will say that a rule r has excess breadth if there exists a state x for which ‖x−w(r)‖ <
d(r) and a(r)f(x) < 0. The second step in establishing Proposition 1 involves what is, in
a sense, an extreme statement about excess breadth – it says that rules are expanded until
the average value of the rule in the marginal cases, ω1 − d∗ and ω1 + d∗, is exactly zero.
Unless both points are cases of indifference, this implies that the rule must be leading to
some incorrect decisions.
Proposition 1 If there does not exist a value d for which f(ω − d) = f(ω + d) = 0, then
the optimal rule at ω has excess breadth.
Proof See appendix.
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Figure 3 provides a simple illustration. The left panel presents a simple piecewise linear
payoff function that reaches a maximum of 1/2 at x = 1/4 and a minimum of −1/2 at
x = 3/4. Action 1 is optimal whenever ω ∈ (0, 1/2). If the first period state is ω1 = 3/8,
then the principal will instruct the agent to choose action 1 if a nearby state arises in
period 2. She will not, however, choose a rule that is always correct by picking d = 1/8. At
this breadth, she benefits from broadening the rule because the loss from choosing action 1
when ω ≈ 1
2
is much smaller than the gain from choosing action 1 when ω ≈ 1
4
. As noted in
the proposition, the principal will, in fact, broaden the rule until it is completely worthless
at the margin. In the illustrated case, the optimal choice is d∗ = 1
4
. At this breadth, the
gain from implementing action 1 at ω1−d∗ = 18 matches the loss from implementing action
1 at ω1 + d
∗ = 5
8
.
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Figure 3: A two period example
3.2 Inefficient rules as a source of performance differences
There is a sizable empirical literature which documents what Gibbons (2006) calls “persis-
tent performance differences among seemingly similar organizations”: that is, substantial
differences in the performance of organizations which are difficult to account for (Mairesse
and Griliches (1990), McGahan (1999), Chew et al. (1990)). In our model historical acci-
dents can be a source of performance differences: “lucky” early realizations of the state can
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lead to a very effective rule book being established, delivering highly efficient outcomes.
Conversely, bad draws early on can have persistent effects which cannot be overcome.
The right panel of Figure 3 graphs the expected second-period payoffs as a function of
the first period state. The principal is best-off if ω1 =
1
4
or ω1 =
3
4
. In these cases, the
principal can issue a rule which is applicable half of the time and which always yields the
correct decision when applicable. The payoff function turns out to be quadratic on the
intervals around the two maxima. The quadratic function implies that there is no first-
order loss in the efficiency of the rule-book when the initial state ω1 is very close to
1
4
or 3
4
.
But the Principal does end up with a completely worthless rule book in the worst states.
3.3 Forms of inefficiency
When the initial state is not equal to one of the ideal points, it is obvious that the principal
must reduce the breadth of the rule and/or its accuracy and therefore ends up with a lower
payoff. Which of these types of inefficiencies occurs is less obvious. For the function in the
example, it turns out that the principal entirely sacrifices accuracy: the breadth d∗ that the
Principal chooses is exactly one-quarter for almost all ω1. The only exceptions are the two
states where the principal is worst off: ω1 = 0 and ω1 =
1
2
. These states are particularly bad
examples on which to base distance-based rules because they are right on the boundary
between the regions where different actions are optimal. In these states the principal’s
second period expected payoff is zero for any choice of d and a so the breadth/inaccuracy
choice is indeterminate.
The fact that the first-period draw of ω1 primarily affects the accuracy of the chosen rule
and not its breadth is somewhat more general than the above example. Suppose that f is
uniquely maximized at y, uniquely minimized at y+ 1
2
, that f is strictly monotonic between
the minimum and maximum, and f is symmetric both in the sense that f(y−z) = f(y+z)
for all z and in the sense that f(x+1
2
) = −f(x) for all x. Then, the principal’s optimal choice
will be d∗ = 1
4
for almost all ω1. An easy argument for this is that the first-order conditions
imply that f(ω1 − d∗) = −f(ω1 + d∗). Symmetry gives f(ω1 − d∗) = f(ω1 + d∗ − 12).4 The
function f takes on each value only twice. Hence we either have that the two arguments
are the same, ω1 − d∗ = ω + d∗ − 12 , or that the arguments are equidistant from the peak
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on opposite sides, y − (ω1 − d∗) = ω1 + d∗ − 12 − y. The former gives d∗ = 14 . The latter
implies that ω1 = y +
1
4
, a non-generic case.
3.4 Sophistication of the rule-making language
Throughout this paper we restrict the Principal to issue a single rule based on each experi-
ence and to issue rules that apply on symmetric neighborhoods around previously realized
states. Relaxing these constraints illustrates that a Principal will be better off if she is
able to communicate in a more sophisticated language. For example, given the function
f pictured in Figure 3 she could achieve the first-best payoff in the second period if the
first period state was ω1 =
1
4
by issuing two rules: a lower-priority rule telling the agent to
take action -1 if w2 is within distance infinity of ω1, and a higher priority rule telling the
agent to take action 1 if w2 is within distance
1
4
of ω1. If the Principal also had the ability
to communicate multiple rules and to communicate asymmetric rules she could achieve
this payoff for any ω1: she would just again use a default rule to apply for all states and
then a higher priority rule on an asymmetric interval around ω1. Hence, the model does
suggest that an ability to convey more sophisticated rules could be a source of performance
differences depending on the historical events that arise.
In the particular environment of this example, the more sophisticated rules described
above do not sound unreasonable: they are like telling the agent to do action 1 in some
cases and action -1 in all others. In other cases, however, we felt that such overlapping rules
seem less reasonable, e.g. the principal could dictate N different actions on concentric rings
around w1 by defining a first rule that applied at distances less than d1, a second higher-
priority rule that applied at distances less than d2 < d1, a third even higher priority rule that
that applied at distances less than d3, and so on. And it is only the unrealistic simplicity of
the one-dimensional model with two actions that makes full efficiency achievable. Somewhat
more sophisticated rules than we use in most of our analyses may be a source of interesting
additional category of rules to study, but we felt the three variants in the current paper
were preferable as a simple framework in which to studying the second-best payoffs that
analogy-based rules can provide in a complex environment.
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4 Three Periods: Learning Curves and Building Rou-
tines
A number of literatures have focused on the dynamics of firm efficiency. There is a vast the-
oretical and empirical literature on learning curves. Another empirical regularity which has
been documented is that firms often “start-small”. Gibbons (2006) refers to the possibility
that communication may start out vague and become more precise over time as “building a
routine”.5 In this section, we develop observations related to these topics by examining the
simplest dynamic version of our model: the three period version. One observation related
to the starting-small literature is that option-value considerations can offset some or all of
the incentive to issue excessively broad rules.
Write rm2 (ω1) for the myopic optimal rule at t = 2. This can be defined either as
the optimal choice in the two-period model described in the previous section or as the
optimal choice in the three-period model for a principal with discount factor δ = 0. Let
dm2 = d(r
m
2 (ω1)) be the breadth of the myopic optimal rule. We say that this rule has excess
breadth at the margin if min(f(ω1−dm2 ), f(ω1 +dm2 )) < 0. Write r∗2(ω1) for the optimal rule
at t = 2 for an agent with discount factor δ > 0.6
4.1 No overwriting
Our first result on the no-overwriting model highlights that option value considerations
lead the principal to “start small” and define narrower rules in the three-period model
than would be used in the two-period model.
Proposition 2 Suppose no overwriting is allowed. Let f be differentiable and suppose that
the myopic optimal rule rm2 (ω1) is a unique interior optimum and has excess breadth at the
margin. Then, the optimal rule at t = 2 in the three-period model has d(r∗2(ω1)) < d
m
2 .
Proof
We show that the expected payoff from any rule r′2, r
′
3(ω2) with d
′
2 ≡ d(r′2) ≥ dm2 is
strictly lower that the expected payoff that is obtained from a strategy we will specify that
includes setting r2 = (ω1, d
m
2 − , a(rm2 (ω1))) for a small  > 0.
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First, consider any strategy r′2, r
′
3(ω2) with d(r
′
2) > d
m
2 . We show that such strategies
cannot be optimal by showing that the expected payoff is improved by switching to the
strategy rm2 , r
′
3(ω2). To see this, note first that r
m
2 provides a strictly greater expected
payoff in the second period. In the third period, the expected payoff conditional on ω3 ∈
[ω1 − d(r′2), ω1 + d(r′2)] is again greater under (rm2 , r′3(ω2)) by the optimality of rm2 . The
third period expected payoff conditional on ω3 6∈ [ω1 − d(r′2), ω1 + d(r′2)] is identical under
the two rules.
Next, consider any strategy r′2, r
′
3(ω2) with d(r
′
2) = d
m
2 . We show that the expected
payoff can be improved by switching to a strategy with a slightly smaller value of d2.
To define this strategy, note first that the assumption that dm2 is regular and has excess
breadth at the margin implies that f(ω1 ± dm2 ) 6= 0. Assume WLOG that f(ω1 + dm2 ) > 0
and f(ω1 − dm2 ) < 0. Hence, we can choose η > 0 so that f(ω + x) > f(ω + dm2 )/2
and f(ω − x) < f(ω − dm2 )/2 for all x ∈ [dm2 , dm2 + 3η]. For 0 <  < η define r2() =
(ω1, d
m
2 − , a(rm2 (ω1)) and
r3(ω2; ) =

r′3(ω2) if ω2 6∈ [ω1 − dm2 − η, ω1 + dm2 + η]
(ω2, ‖ω2 − (ω1 + dm2 − )‖, 1) if ω2 ∈ [ω1 + dm2 − , ω1 + dm2 + η]
(ω2, ‖ω2 − (ω1 − dm2 + )‖,−1) if ω2 ∈ [ω1 − dm2 − η, ω1 − dm2 + ]
In words, these strategies consist of narrowing the breadth of rule r2 by  and then taking
advantage of the more narrow definition to choose an  broader rule than would have been
possible in these cases when the realization of ω2 is within η of the boundary of the initial
rule. We show that r2(), r3(ω2; ) gives a higher payoff than r
′
2, r
′
3(ω2) when  is small.
To see this, note first that the disadvantage of r2() in the second period is O(
2) because
payoffs are different only if ω2 ∈ I ≡ [ω1 − dm2 , ω1 − dm2 + ] ∪ [ω1 + dm2 − , ω1 + dm2 ], which
occurs with probability 2, and the expected payoff difference conditional on ω2 being in
this interval is O(). In the third period, divide the cases where the third period rule is
different into two subcases: ω2 ∈ I; and ω2 6∈ I. Payoff losses from the first case are at
most O(3) because the case only occurs with O() probability, and when it occurs the
third period difference in rule books is at worst like the difference at the start of the second
period. In the second case r2(), r3(ω2; ) and r
′
2, r
′
3(ω2) can differ on two sets. First, they
will differ for some ω3 ∈ I. Second, they can differ for some ω3 6∈ I. Payoff losses due to
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realizations with ω3 ∈ I are again at most O(2): again the third period difference in rule
books is at worst like the second-period difference. Finally, we have payoff differences due
to realizations with ω2 6∈ I and ω3 6∈ I. These provide an O() advantage to r2(), r3(ω2; ).
To see this, consider what happens in one of the two possible intervals of ω2 for which the
rule books are different: ω2 ∈ [ω1−dm2 −η, ω1−dm2 ]. Here, the r3(ω2; ) specifies the correct
decision be taken whenever ω3 ∈ [ω2− z− , ω1− dm2 ] (and for some ω3 ∈ I) whereas r′3(ω2)
only applies on the smaller interval [ω2 − z, ω1 − dm2 ] where z = ‖(ω1 − dm2 ) − ω2‖. The
interval of ω2 for which such differences arise is of width η. The expected payoff advantage
when they do arise is at least |f(ω1−dm2 )|/2. Hence, this is an O() increase in the payoff.
There is a similar O() gain from ω2 in the other subinterval of I.
Hence, for sufficiently small  the strategy r2(), r3(ω2; ) gives a higher payoff.
QED
Figure 4 provides an illustration. The left panel graphs the breadth of the myopic
optimal rule, d(rm2 (ω1)), and the breadth of the optimal second-period rule in the three-
period model, d(r∗2(ω1)) for the function f pictured in Figure 3.
7 Recall that the myopic
optimal rule had a distance of 1
4
for almost all ω1. This is shown as a dotted line in the
graph. In the three period model, this breadth is never optimal. By Proposition 2 the
optimal second-period rule is narrower. The solid line in the figure gives this breadth.
Note that sometimes the optimal rule has zero breadth. This is the case near ω1 = 0,
ω1 =
1
2
and ω1 = 1. For other values of ω1 the optimal rule has breadth close to
1
4
.
The contrast between the static and dynamically optimal rules illustrates that our model
provides a potential explanation for observations that firms sometimes intentionally “start
small.” Watson (2002) argues that one rationale for starting small is to build cooperation
in a low-stakes environment and then enjoy the benefits of the cooperative equilibrium in
a high-stakes environment. Our model offers a different (and potentially complementary)
notion of starting small. There is option value in developing rules and consequently rules
can be under-inclusive, particularly early on (recall Proposition 2). One way to interpret
the actions in our model that would make it connect with the starting-small idea would
be to regard the zero expected payoff that obtains in states for which no rule has been
defined as coming from a blanket instruction that the firm should decline any business
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opportunities that might arise which do not fall into any of the categories for which rules
have been defined. With this interpretation, our model would be one in which the size of
the business grows over time as new situations arise and enable the firm to promulgate
rules about how it should exploit such opportunities. Early in its life a firm may decline
opportunities that would be profitable in the short run because accepting the opportunity
would establish a less-than-ideal precedent.
The three-period model remains a model in which historical accidents can lead to per-
sistent performance differences. The right panel of Figure 4 graphs the expected payoff
as a function of ω1. In the region where the optimal rule has positive breadth, the payoff
function again declines smoothly away from maxima at ω1 =
1
4
and ω1 =
3
4
.
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Figure 4: A three-period example
We emphasized above that option-value considerations work against the incentive to
promulgate excessively broad rules which we had noted in the two-period model. We would
like to point out here that indeed the option-value consideration can dominate in a fairly
strong sense. We will say that the initial rule in the three-period model has insufficient
breadth at the margin if d∗2 <
1
2
and f(ω1 − d∗2) and f(ω1 + d∗2) are both of the same sign
as a∗2. In words, this says that the Principal chooses not to expand the domain of the rule
even though it would be correct in all marginal cases. Our next proposition says that this
will occur for some model specifications:
Proposition 3 There exist payoff functions for the three-period no-overwriting model for
which the optimal second-period rule has insufficient breadth at the margin for a positive
measure of values of ω1.
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The left panel of Figure 4 illustrates that the payoff function given above provides
the necessary example. Three cases in which it is intuitive that the optimal rule will have
insufficient breadth are when ω1 close to zero, one-half, and one. Here, the optimal breadth
is zero, which will satisfy the insufficient breadth at the margin condition. The optimal
breadth is zero because the option value to keeping rules undefined outweighs the potential
short-run benefit to making a rule. For example, suppose ω1 =
1
2
+ . In this case, a
second-period gain of approximately  could be obtained by making a rule that action -1
should be chosen if ω ∈ [1
4
+ , 3
4
+ ], or a smaller gain of 42 could be obtained by defining
a much narrower rule that action -1 should be chosen on [1
2
, 1
2
+ 2]. However, in each case,
such a rule can prevent a much better rule from being defined in the third period. For
example, if ω2 =
3
8
, the former would prevent us from defining any rule at all, and the
latter would force us to limit the domain of the rule to [1
4
, 1
2
] instead of [1
8
, 5
8
].
A second noteworthy situation in which we get insufficient breadth at the margin is when
ω1 =
1
4
. In this situation one’s initial thought might be that the principal has received a
fortunate draw and will choose d = 1
4
to define the exactly optimal rule on half of the
states. This exactly optimal rule, however, is still of zero value at the margin. Under the
no overwriting assumption the marginal breadth has an opportunity cost. For example, if
the second period state is ω2 =
5
8
the principal will be able to dictate that action -1 be taken
when ω3 ∈ [12 , 34 ], but will be unable to promulgate a broader rule covering [12 − , 34 + ].
We omit a formal proof of Proposition 3 because it is unexciting and the graph serves
as a numerical proof.
4.2 Incremental overwriting
The above discussion has focused on the no-overwriting version of our model. In the incre-
mental overwriting model, some of the constraints which we had mentioned in explaining
why a principal might intentionally make a rule excessively narrow no longer exist. For
example, the principal can overwrite the interval [1
2
−σ, 1
2
] at t = 3 if the draw of ω2 makes
this attractive. The incremental overwriting model does have some constraints, however,
and these can still provide an incentive to “start small” in the sense of choosing a narrower
second-period rule than would be chosen by a myopic agent.
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Proposition 4 In the three period incremental overwriting model there exist payoff func-
tions f and states ω1 for which d(r
∗
2(ω1)) < d
m
2 .
Proof
We prove this by providing an example. Suppose f(x) = 1 if x ∈ [, 1
3
−] and f(x) = −1
otherwise.8 For ω1 =
1
6
the myopically optimal rule is to take action -1 everywhere: this
gives a payoff of 1
3
+ 4, whereas the more obvious narrow rule dictating that action 1 be
taken on [, 1
3
− ] gives a payoff of 1
3
− 2.
In the three-period incremental overwriting model, however, the narrower rule provides
a strictly greater expected payoff if  is small and δ is close to one. To see this, note that
the narrower rule can be improved in the third period whenever ω2 6∈ [, 13 − ]. When
such ω2 arise, the optimal incremental rule is to prescribe action -1 on the largest interval
around ω2 contained in [
1
3
− , 1 + ]. On average this interval has width 1
3
+ , so the
expected gain is (2
3
+ 2)(1
3
+ ) ≈ 2
9
. The broad rule can be improved only if ω2 ∈ [, 13 − ].
Again, the best way to improve the rule is to define r3 to extend to the nearest edge of the
interval [, 1
3
− ]. There is a payoff gain of two whenever ω3 is such that the correction is
effective, but the expected gain is still just 2(1
3
− 2)(1
6
− ) ≈ 1
9
. The nontrivial difference
in third period expected payoffs will easily outweigh the  order second-period differences
if δ is close to one and  is not too large.
QED
An intuition for why the narrower rule is preferable in the example in the above proof
is that a constraint imposed by the incremental overwriting model is that one cannot go
back at t = 3 and redefine the rule involving ω1. Hence, there is a benefit to immediately
employing ω1 in its best long-run role. In this case, the natural use for ω1 =
1
6
is as the
leading example of of the set of situations where action 1 is optimal.
4.3 Vast overwriting
In the vast overwriting model there is no incentive to leave rules undefined. The long-run
optimal strategy is always to define each period’s rulebook to maximize the payoff in that
period. Hence r∗2 = r
m
2 . In this section we regard the vast overwriting model primarily as
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reinforcing the observation that it is constraints on the Principal’s ability to modify rules
which create the incentive to start small.
5 The Infinite Horizon Model
In previous sections we have used two- and three-period modes to bring out some of the pri-
mary economic considerations of rule development. In real-world organizations, of course,
rules development is a longer and more gradual process. In this section we use the infi-
nite horizon version of our model to develop some additional insights. The first subsection
focuses on long-run performance differences. The second examines the natural idea that
patient Principals will develop nearly optimal rules.
5.1 Long-run performance differences
In the long run the Principal will have many opportunities to issue or refine rules. While
the rule book may forever grow longer and longer as these opportunities keep arising, it is
intuitive that these changes cannot continue to be significant: each firm’s rule book should
in some sense settle down and converge to some limit rule book. We should be able to talk
about long-run efficiency differences across firms in terms of these limit rule books.
Our first result provides a way to formalize this intuition. The main idea is to focus
on each rule book’s expected payoff rather than on the growing list of individual rules it
might contain. Specifically, we define pit to be the expected payoff in period t given the rule
book which the Principal will have defined by that point in time. This pit is a function of
the random draws ω1, ω2, . . . , ωt−1 and thus can be thought of usefully both as a function
of the random draws and as a random variable. A convergence theorem is:
Proposition 5 Write pit(ω0, . . . , ωt−1) ≡ E(pi(at, ωt, Rt(ω0, . . . , ωt−1)) for the expected pay-
off in period t given the rule book which the principal has defined in equilibrium. In any of
the overwriting cases there exists a limiting random variable pi∞ such that pit converges to
pi∞ in probability.
Proof
In both the no-overwriting and vast-overwriting versions of the model we have E(pit|pit−1) ≥
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pit−1. In the vast-overwriting case this is because it is always possible to define a weakly
better rule book with a superset of previous realizations. In the no-overwriting case this
is because the rule that the principal defined in period t − 1 must have been better than
defining a rule dictating that the opposite action be taken on the same domain. The process
pi = (pit : t ≥ 0) is adapted and E(|pit|) is finite for all t, so pi is a submartingale. Hence,
Doob’s Forward Convergence Theorem (Williams 1991, p.109) applies and guarantees the
existence of a pi∞ such that pit converges to pi∞ almost surely. This implies convergence in
probability.
In the incremental overwriting case the argument is a little more complicated. Here,
we define vt(ω0, . . . , ωt−1) ≡ (1−δ)
∑∞
s=0 δ
sE(pi(at+s, ωt+s, Rt(ω0, . . . , ωt+s−1))|ω0, . . . , ωt−1)
to be the expectation of the average-per-period discounted future payoff at each point in
time. Using the facts that vt = (1 − δ)pit + δE(vt+1|ω0, . . . , ωt−1) and pit(ω0, . . . , ωt−1) ≤
vt(ω0, . . . , ωt−1) (which follows from the fact that the principal has the option of deciding
to never change the rule book) we have E(vt+1|vt) ≥ vt so again Doob’s theorem guarantees
the existence of a pi∞ such that vt converges to pi∞ almost surely. To show that pit converges
in probability to pi∞ it then remains only to show that vt − pit converges in probability to
zero. To see this note that vt − pit is a nonnegative valued random variable and E(vt −
pit) =
δ
1−δ (E(vt+1)− E(vt)) converges to zero because E(vt) and E(vt+1) both converge to
E(pi∞). For nonnegative random variables convergence of the expectation to zero implies
convergence to zero in probability.
QED
One can think of the pi∞ defined in the above proposition as the efficiency of the rule
book which the Principal develops “in the long run”. The statement that pit converges
to pi∞ is giving a formal sense in which we can say that the rule book that the Principal
develops over time always settles down and approaches some limit. The sense in which
we have shown that it approaches this limit is a probabilistic statement about closeness
in payoff space – the convergence in probability means that for t large there is a high
probability that the efficiency pit of the period t rule book is close to the limiting efficiency
that the principal will obtain in the long run “after” all future modifications.
The distribution of pi∞ describes how often we end up with a limiting rule book that
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is very efficient/moderately efficient/highly inefficient in the long run. It can be thought
of as describing the distribution of performance levels we would expect to see among ex
ante identical firms purely because of historical accidents. The distribution of the random
variable pit describes how frequently each efficiency level will be seen at time t. Convergence
in probability implies convergence in distribution. Hence, Proposition 5 implies that the
distribution of pi∞ can also be thought of as an approximation to the distribution of the
efficiency of the period t rule book pit for any large t.
The distribution of pi∞ will depend on all of the elements of our model: the underlying
state-contingent payoff function; how patient the Principal is; the overwriting restrictions
the Principal faces; etc. In the no-overwriting version of our model history has a long-run
impact. For some realizations of ω0, ω1, . . . , ... the limiting rule book will be highly efficient
and for others it may be very inefficient.
Figure 5 provides an illustration of the limiting distribution for one specification of the
model: it plots the density of pi∞ for the f function of Figure 3 under the assumption that
the principal acts myopically (δ = 0) and is subject to the no-overwriting constraint. One
noteworthy feature of the distribution of the graph is that there is a significant amount of
mass close to 1/4. This reflects the simplicity of the optimal decision rule: as noted earlier
there is no first-order loss in the second period payoff when the initial state differs slightly
from 1/4 or 3/4; and whenever this happens the Principal will eventually fill out the rule
book to be nearly efficient in all other states. It is also noteworthy, however, that there
is a substantial amount of mass at much lower efficiency levels. This highlights that our
model predicts substantial path dependence. A series of early “bad” realizations–in the
sense that they lead the firm to promulgate substantially inefficient rules–have a persistent
effect. Extremely inefficient rule books arise only rarely in this specification – they only
occur when the Principal receives multiple unlucky draws.
In the vast-overwriting version of the model there will be no long-run inefficiency: pi∞
would be equal to the first-best payoff with probability one. When the state space is a
line and f(x) crosses zero a finite number of times the argument is simple and yields a
particularly strong conclusion. The set of states for which a = 1 is optimal (and for which
a = −1 is optimal) is a union of intervals. Divide each interval into four equal subintervals.
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Figure 5: Distribution of long-run payoff pi∞ with myopic play
As soon as the observed history ω1, ω2, . . . , ωT contains points in both the second and
the third subintervals of each interval the first best can be achieved by overlapping rules
dictating that a = 1 (or -1 as appropriate) should be chosen in a neighborhood extending
from those points exactly to the boundary of the region where a = 1 is optimal. This
implies, in fact, that the first-best rule book becomes possible in finite time (with probability
one).9 In more general and complex state spaces like that pictured in Figure 2 the first-best
will not be possible at any finite time t, but the result that there is no long-run inefficiency
will generalize under appropriate regularity conditions: when the set of observed ωt is very
rich an approximately optimal rule book can be achieved simply by defining the appropriate
rule on a very small neighborhood around each observed ωt. The lesson we would take away
from this model is that with vast overwriting history matters but only in terms of affecting
how long it takes and how much inefficiency is incurred before efficient rules to develop.
In the incremental-overwriting model we conjecture that there is also no long run ineffi-
ciency under some set of regularity conditions. The intuition behind this conjecture is that
early on inefficient rules like that illustrated in Figure 3 will be promulgated, but once the
whole interval is covered opportunities will continually arise to overwrite previous mistakes
including some which allow an interval of mistakes to be completely eliminated. Hence,
we conjecture that the difference between the vast-overwriting and incremental-overwriting
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models is not in terms of what happens in the very long run, but in terms of how quickly
or slowly efficiency is approached.
5.2 Limiting payoffs for patient principals
The figure in the previous subsection illustrated the efficiency of the limiting rule books
developed by completely impatient Principals. It is intuitive that patient Principals should
do better. For example, we noted in our analysis of the three-period model that patient
Principals will “start small” and decline to issue any rule when the initial realization is
sufficiently unfortunate. In this section we present some results on how (very) patient
Principals do.
5.2.1 Vast overwriting
Limiting payoffs for patient principals are easiest to characterize in the vast-overwriting
version of our model. The rules developed in this model are independent of the Principal’s
discount factor because the Principal always rewrites the rule book to be the best possible
after each period. As a result a fully optimal rule book is not only achieved asymptotically,
but develops in finite time if the function f is well behaved. The first-best rulebook would
specify that at = a
FB(ωt) ≡ sign(f(ωt)). Write V FB =
∫ 1
0
|f(x)|dx for the per-period
payoff that this rule would give. This is an upper bound on the expected payoff that a
rational player can achieve in any period. A formal result showing the Principal reaches
this upper bound in finite time is contained in the appendix.
An immediate corollary of the result is that the expected per period payoff of the
Principal converges to V FB in the δ → 1 limit: the Principal gets the best possible payoff
from some time T on, and when δ is close to one this is all that matters.10
The rulebook used to achieve this employs rules with overlapping domains that specify
the same action on the overlap. Some such overlapping is necessary to achieve the first best
in finite time. If compatible rules are not allowed to overlap, then on each interval Sj we
will be able to define rules that extend exactly to the right endpoint or exactly to the left
endpoint, but not both (unless the ω’s satisfy a relation that is satisfied with probability
zero). We need rules to end exactly at n+ 1 endpoints to achieve the first best. Hence, the
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first best is not achievable in finite time.
5.2.2 No overwriting and incremental overwriting with δ close to 1
The no-overwriting and incremental-overwriting versions of our model impose additional
constraints on the principal and will reduce her payoffs. Nonetheless, it is fairly easy to
show that payoffs still must approximate the first best when the principal is patient.
Proposition 6 Suppose that f(x) crosses zero a finite number of times. In the no-overwriting
and incremental-overwriting models the principal’s average per-period payoff converges to
V FB in the limit as δ → 1.
Proof
Suppose that f(x) crosses zero n − 1 times and let 0 = x0 < x1 < . . . < xn = 1 be
such that f(x) is always nonnegative or always nonpositive on each interval Sj = [xj−1, xj].
Write aj for the optimal action on Sj.
In the incremental overwriting model we show that the optimal payoff has converges
to V FB in the limit as δ → 1 by exhibiting a suboptimal strategy that gives a payoff
that converging to V FB as δ → 1. This provides a lower bound on the limit of the
payoff of the optimal strategy. To define the desired suboptimal strategy, define Sj1 =
[xj−1 + 14(xj − xj−1), xj−1 + 12(xj − xj−1)] and Sj2 = [xj − 12(xj − xj−1), xj − 14(xj − xj−1)].
Consider the strategy of defining rules a rule book that will eventually have 2n rules
by waiting until the first period in which ωt falls into each Sjk and then defining a rule
specifying that the correct action be taken on the interval extending from ω2 to the closest
endpoint of Sj. For example, ωτ ∈ Sj1 and ωt was not in Sj1 for all t < τ then in period
τ add the rule rτ = (ωτ , ωτ − xj−1, aj, j).11 With probability one there exists a T such
that {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωT} ∩ Sjk 6= ∅ for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n and for k = 1, 2. Once this happens,
for any t ≥ T the the rule book applies for all ωt ∈ [0, 1] and specifies the correct action
aFB(ωt). Hence, payoff V
FB is achieved in all periods from T on. This implies that the
expected payoff from this suboptimal strategy will converge to V FB in the δ → 1 limit.
In the no-overwriting case the argument is only slightly more involved. We define a set
of feasible strategies s(). We then show that the expected average per-period discounted
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payoff V (s()) of strategy s() has limδ→1 V (s()) ≥ (1− )V FB. Hence, the limit as δ → 1
of the payoff of the optimal strategy must be at least (1− )V FB for every . This implies
that the limit is V FB.
To do this, we define s() to be the strategy of waiting until a state arises that is
very, very close to the center of one of the Sj and then defining a rule that specifies the
correct action on as broad of an interval as possible. More formally, given any , pick
η < minj |xj − xj−1| so that
∫ z+η
z
|f(ω)|dω < V FB/n for all z. Let s() be the strategy
which defines a new rule only in periods τ in which the state ωτ is within η/2 of the center
of some Sj and which are such that ωt was not within η/2 of the center of that Sj for any
t < τ . In such periods specify that the optimal action be taken as large of a subinterval of
Sj as possible. Now, with probability 1 there will be a period T by which we have defined
rules within each Sj. Once this occurs, the optimal action is taken except on a collection
of n subintervals each of which has width less than η. The total payoff loss from taking a
random action on each of these subintervals is at most V FB/n. So in the limit as δ → 1
this strategy provides a payoff of at least (1− )V FB.
QED
Remark
1. The assumption that f(x) has a finite number of crossings is convenient for this
proof, but is not necessary. If f(x) crosses zero a countable number of times, we can
implement a similar strategy in each subinterval. Not all subintervals will be covered,
but each half of a subinterval of width w is covered with probability (1 − w
2
)t−1 in
period t. Hence, the expected payoff again converges to the first best.
A final result of this section is that when no overwriting is allowed the first best is not
achieved in finite time. This is a mechanical consequence of the principal’s limited ability
to define rules. This time we do give a formal statement and a proof.
Proposition 7 Consider the no-overwriting version of our model. Assume that there
is no nontrivial subinterval (a, b) on which f is almost everywhere equal to zero. Then,
Prob{E(Vt+1|ω1, . . . , ωt) = V FB} = 0 for every t.
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Proof
Let Ω∞ be the set of all sequences {ωt}. We show the result by partitioning Ω∞ into two
disjoint subsets Ω∞ = Ω1∪Ω2 and showing that the result holds for almost all {ωt} in each
Ωi provided that Ωi is not of measure zero.
The division is simple: we write d0 for the width of the first nontrivial rule issued by
the principal, i.e. d0({ωt}) = d(rs) where s is such that d(rs) > 0 and d(rt) = 0 for all
t < s and set Ω1 to be the set of all {ωt} with d0({ωt}) ≥ 12 .
Case 1: {ωt} ∈ Ω1
In this case, the agent chooses at random in the first s− 1 periods and chooses a state-
independent action in all future periods. Hence, we have E(Vt|ω1, . . . , ωt−1) = 0 for all
t < s and E(Vt|ω1, . . . , ωt−1) ≤ |
∫
f(x)dx| < ∫ |f(x)|dx = V FB for all t > s, with the strict
inequality following from our assumption that f is continuous and takes on positive and
negative values.
Case 2: {ωt} ∈ Ω2
It suffices to show that with probability one there is a nonempty interval that is not
covered by any rule. This follows easily by induction. In period s there is an interval of
width 1−2d0 that is uncovered. If in any period t, some interval of width w with 0 < w < 1
is uncovered, then a subinterval remains uncovered in period t+ 1 unless ωt lies exactly in
the middle of the uncovered interval from period t. This event occurs with probability one.
QED
The impossibility of obtaining the first best in finite time does not extend to the
incremental-overwriting model. Consider for example, the example shown in Figure 3.
There is positive probability that first draw will be similar to that pictured and the second
will be just to the right of three-fourths leaving the principal with a rule book with rules
that are correct except on two intervals: one just to the right of zero and one just to the
right of one-half. If the next two states lie in [1/8, 1/4] and [5/8, 3/4] the principal will
issue rules (overlapping with previously defined rules) that completely fix the mistakes.
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6 Delegation Structures
So far our environment has been sufficiently simple that there has been a single possible
delegation structure for the authority relationship/firm: a single principal, a single agent
and a single task. We now consider a richer environment where the principal has a single
unit of time, but may do two things: perform a task herself, or communicate about it to
an agent. We assume that performing a task is more time consuming than communicating
about it. In particular, we assume that performing a task takes one unit of time, but
communicating to an agent takes only 1/2 a unit of time. The principal has two agents
available.
More concretely, suppose there are two tasks i = 1, 2. The principal’s payoff on task i
is pii(ai, ωi), where ai is the action taken on task i and ωi is a task-specific state of nature.
As before, the principal’s payoff in the full game is the discounted sum of her per period
payoffs: V =
∑T
t=1 δ
t(pi1(a1t, ω1t) + pi2(a2t, ω2t)). In each period, Principal has two options.
First, he can communicate rules to both agents at the start of the period. They will
then carry out these instructions as in our standard model. We call this “full delegation.”
Second, the Principal can instead carry out one of the actions herself. If she does this, we
assume that she does not have sufficient time to communicate with the other agent, so that
the agent carries out the most recently communicated rule book. We assume the Principal
does observe both ω1 and ω2 and can base rules on these in the future. We call this “partial
delegation.”
In some situations it would be appropriate to assume that delegation structures are
time invariant. In this case we have:
Proposition 8 Consider any of the overwriting assumptions, suppose that f(x) crosses
zero a finite number of times, and that delegation strategies are time invariant. Then if δ
is sufficiently large, full delegation is optimal.
Proof
From Propositions 6 and 7 we know that as δ → 1 the principal’s average per-period
payoff converges to V FB. Partial delegation cannot achieve this since there is no commu-
nication on one of the tasks and the expected payoff on that task is zero. Even though
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the first best is obtained on the other task, the sum of the payoffs on the two tasks will be
worse than a payoff that approaches the first-best on both as δ → 1.
QED
In other situations it may be reasonable to assume that firms can change their delegation
structure as the firm matures. In this case, our model becomes a theory of organizational
change. In the first period, the Principal must practice partial delegation. Full delegation
will provide no benefits because there is no history on which to base rules, whereas with
partial delegation she can achieve the first-best payoff on one of the two tasks. In the
vast-overwriting case, at least, the Principal must switch at some point to full delegation:
as history accumulates it will eventually become possible to achieve a superior payoff by
delegating both tasks. (Switching directly to partially delegating the other action is inferior
because before any rule has been communicated it provides a payoff that is no better
than the payoff that was achievable at the start of the game.) The long-run organization
structure is indeterminate. If the first best is achievable when the Principal first switches
to full delegation then there is obviously no benefit from further switches in organizational
form. But if the Principal can communicate the first-best rule on exactly one task at this
time, then she strictly prefers to use partial delegation at least for some period of time
after this.
Other variants of this model could be considered. For example, one could assume
that the Principal and Agent do not accumulate shared experiences when the Principal is
working on the other task. Principals in such models will face a tradeoff: do they take an
optimal action now or invest in developing shared experience. The dependence which the
basic model exhibited can be magnified in such settings: there is both a direct effect of
history on payoffs and an additional indirect effect whereby a fortunate history allows the
Principal to adopt a delegation structure that is more efficient in the long run. We leave
the exploration of such models to future work.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a simple model of second-best rule development. We
model rules as instructions provided to agents who must react to idiosyncratic events in
a timely manner. We assume that rules must take the form of analogies telling the agent
how he should behave in situations similar to previously observed events. Accumulated
history is what enables Principals to communicate complex, contingent rules to agents.
But Principals speed up the rule-development process by broadening rules in ways that
make them somewhat inaccurate. We have discussed several considerations that come
out of the basic economics of the model: the short-run incentive for excess breadth that
comes from considering whether the rule has value in marginal cases, dynamic option-value
considerations which provide an incentive to keep rules narrow, and the long-run payoffs
that will be achieved.
Our model is potentially relevant to a number of applied topics. One, which we men-
tioned in the introduction but have not emphasized since, is the development of refined
interpretations of statutes by common law courts. Here, the Principal should be thought
of as a higher-level court which has a complete understanding of how it would like the law
to be applied to every possible case. The way in which it can communicate to lower courts,
however, is by writing decisions explaining how the law should have been applied in partic-
ular cases. These prior cases are the basis of our analogies and the distance parameter can
be interpreted as the writing around the decision suggesting that it should apply broadly
or narrowly. Our incentive results describe tradeoffs higher-level courts face. The desire
to change how lower courts act right away provides an incentive to write excessively broad
decisions. The desire to wait for a better test case is the counteracting force that may lead
courts to decline to hear a case they would overturn. The understanding that precedents
are not to be overturned except in rare circumstances is an “overwriting” constraint and our
model illustrates that these may be important to the efficiency of the rules which develop.
These ideas could certainly be extended in future work and other factors unique to this
application (costs of hearing appeals, competing higher-level courts with different opinions,
hierarchies of courts) could provide opportunities for many interesting extensions.
35
Our other main intended application, of course, is to the informal analogy-based rules
that managers communicate to their subordinates. Here, our motivation was that the world
is a complex place and baseline rules that can be communicated in general terms will be
highly inefficient. Common experiences create the opportunity to improve on this baseline.
Here, our model is potentially relevant to a number of existing literatures. One which
we have stressed is the literature on persistent performance differences between seemingly
similar firms. There are a number of existing explanations for such differences, e.g. they
might correspond to different equilibria of a repeated game (Leibenstein (1987)). Our
model provides an alternate explanation emphasizing the natural path dependence of rule
development. It can be the case that a firm has more efficient communication than another
purely because of chance: they got some good draws early on which allowed them to develop
an effective rule book.
Furthermore, the model with multiple activities highlights that there can be a compli-
cated evolution of governance structures because of communication needs. Various activ-
ities may or may not be delegated, and this can change over time as more effective rules
are developed. At a minimum, this suggests that bounded communication is a potential
explanation for the heterogeneity of observed organizational forms.
Another related literature is that on learning curves. In our model firms’ performance
will usually improve over time as each period’s experience provides an opportunity to
improve upon existing rules. These improvements may account for the typical shape of a
learning curve: at first big improvements can be made by defining broad rules but eventually
most of the space will be covered and new rules will have only small incremental benefits.
Rates will be different for different firms due to path dependence and will also be related
to primitives like the rate at which experiences arrive, the patience of the Principal, and
the scope for overwriting. It would be interesting to explore whether such explanations can
illuminate existing empirical evidence on heterogeneity of rates of learning (Argote and
Epple (1990)).
Similar comments can be made with regard to other topics within the literature on
organizations. Our model highlights the effects of a number of parameters on performance
difference. The contrasts between what we find in examining different variants of our model
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also brings out the potential relevance of the ability to “overwrite” as a characteristic that
may distinguish how firms fare. For example, it may be that overwriting existing rules is
easier in small organizations or in organizations where the Principal and Agent of our model
directly interact, and overwriting is more difficult in large organizations where there is no
direct communication and rules diffuse in a less-controlled word of mouth process. Whether
proxies for differences in the ability to “overwrite” might explain whether some firms in an
industry end up more efficient that others, or whether industry-level proxies for differences
in the ability to overwrite might explain why there is more performance heterogeneity in
some industries than others are examples of questions that our model raises.
We conclude by highlighting a direction for further work. It would be desirable to
provide a more concrete foundation for the inability of the principal to describe the state
to the agent. We remarked early on that we think of our assumptions restricting firms to use
analogy-based rules as a reduced form way of capturing what might occur in a model where
state spaces were highly complex and some cost of communication made communicating via
analogies preferable to trying to communicate by describing sets of states in other terms.
It would be interesting to explore what kinds of environments, or what other cognitive
limitations, give rise to the inability to perfectly communicate, and to see whether such
models might suggest alternate rule-making models to the one we explore here.
8 Appendix
8.1 Fully rational variant
Proposition 9 Suppose that the function f has a finite number of zero crossings. Suppose
the agent is fully rational and has the same preferences as the principal but doesn’t know
f . Then, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the optimal action is taken in every
period after the first with probability one.
To see how this can be done, suppose that after ω1 is observed by the principal and
agent the principal issues a second-period rule (ω1, d, a, p) as follows. Rather than sending
a rule that is to be interpreted literally, the principal uses the d part of the rule to encode
several pieces of information. First, he sets the initial digits after the decimal point to be a
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binary string (zeroes and ones) which specifies the number of times f crosses zero. This is
followed by a single digit of number 2, which is interpreted as a “stop code” indicating the
next component. The second component is a single binary digit indicating which action
to take on the first interval; it is followed by another 2. Finally, the location of each of
the crossings is encoded as follows. The first digit of this component of the string is the
first digit of the first crossing, the second is the first digit of the second crossing, and so
on for all n crossings. Then the second digit of the first crossing follows, and so on. In
this manner, a single real number encodes everything about the function f that the agent
needs to know to take the optimal action. Under the standard assumption that players
play best responses to each others’ strategies, it will be an equilibrium for the principal to
send this message in the first period and for the agent to take the optimal action from the
second period on.12
We have not stated the proposition in the greatest possible level of generality. For
example, one can also communicate the locations of a countable number of zero crossings
by arranging them in a triangular array, e.g. first giving the first digit of one crossing, then
the second digit of the first crossing and the first digit of a second, then the third digit of
the first, the second digit of the second, and the first digit of the third, and so on. One
could try to refine away these equilibria by ruling out equilibria which involve the agent
processing an infinite string of bits, but there are many other coding schemes one could
use. For example, the Principal could communicate any rule that can be described in finite
space in English-language text by encoding the text in ASCII just as is done when sending
an e-mail.
We think of Proposition 9 not as a positive result, but rather as a cautionary note
illustrating that the standard “rational” approach is unappealing for the problems we are
trying to address. Specifically, the assumption of best-responding to equilibrium strategies
embeds a degree of knowledge of the structure of the problem and of the meaning of
language that does not fit with other aspects of our formulation. In the remainder of the
paper we rule out schemes like the ones described above by assuming directly that agents
interpret rules literally.
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8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 follows from the following claim.
Claim 1 Consider the two-period version of the models under any of the overwriting as-
sumptions.
1. If f is not antisymmetric around ω1 then all optimal rules have d
∗(ω1) > 0 and the
principal’s expected second period payoff is positive, E(V2|ω1) > 0.
2. Any interior optimal choice d∗(ω1) is such that f(ω1 − d∗(ω1)) = −f(ω1 + d∗(ω1)).
Proof
The principal’s expected second period payoff with rule (ω1, d, a) is
E(V2|ω1) = a
∫ ω1+d
ω1−d
f(x)dx.
This is a continuous function of a and d and the parameters are chosen from a compact
set so it achieves its maximum. The maximum is zero only if
∫ ω1+d
ω1−d f(x)dx = 0 for all d,
which implies that f is antisymmetric around ω1: f(ω1 − d) = −f(ω1 + d) for all d.
E(V2|ω1) is differentiable, so any interior optimum has
d
dd
∫ ω1+d
ω1−d
f(x)dx
∣∣∣∣
d=d∗
= 0
which implies f(x− d∗) = −f(x+ d∗).
QED
8.3 Limiting payoffs under vast overwriting
Proposition 10 Consider the infinite horizon vast-overwriting version of our model with
any discount factor δ > 0. Suppose that f(x) crosses zero a finite number of times. Then,
with probability one there exists a T such that the action aFB(ωt) is chosen in period t for
all t ≥ T .
Proof
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Suppose that f(x) crosses zero n − 1 times and let 0 = x0 < x1 < . . . < xn = 1 be
such that f(x) is always nonnegative or always nonpositive on each interval Sj = [xj−1, xj].
Write aj for the optimal action on Sj. As in the proof of Proposition 6 define Sj1 =
[xj−1+ 14(xj−xj−1), xj−1+ 12(xj−xj−1)] and Sj2 = [xj− 12(xj−xj−1), xj− 14(xj−xj−1)]. With
probability one there exists a T such that {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωT} ∩ Sjk 6= ∅ for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n
and for k = 1, 2. For any t > T we can define τ(j, k) so that ωτ(j,k) ∈ Sjk. Define a rulebook
for period t by
Rt =
n⋃
j=1
{
(ωτ(j,1), ωτ(j,1) − xj−1, aj, j), (ωτ(j,2), xj − ωτ(j,2), aj,−j)
}
Note that one or more of the rules applies to each ω ∈ [0, 1] and that for any ω ∈ Sj any
rule that applies to ω specifies action aj.13 Hence, Rt will result in action a
FB(ωt) being
chosen. Given that Rt achieves payoff V
FB for all t > T , any other optimal rule book must
also lead the Principal to choose action aFB(ωt) with probability one for t > T .
QED
Remark: The assumption that f(x) crosses zero a finite number of times is necessary
for the first part of the result. If f(x) has an infinite number of crossings then no finite rule
can specify the optimal action in between each of the crossings. Hence, the upper bound
V FB cannot achieved in any period.
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Notes
1We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this terminology.
2Aghion et al. (1991) study a model of optimal learning by experimentation with a single decision maker
who is uncertain about his own payoff function.
3This question mostly applies to the no overwriting variant. In the other variants the Principal can
effectively issue default instructions by issuing a low-priority rule that applies to all states within distance
one half of some previous state.
4For some values of ω1 and d the term on the left will need to be f(ω1 − d∗ + 1) and/or the term on
the right-hand side will need to be f(ω1 + d
∗ − 32 ) or f(ω + d∗ + 12 ) to ensure that the values are in [0, 1].
5See Chassang (2010) for a recent model.
6This is obviously a function of δ. We omit the dependence from the notation where it will not cause
confusion.
7The discount factor of δ = 1 was used for these graphs.
8The example uses a discontinuous f to make the computations easy. A continuous example could be
obtained by choosing a nearby continuous function.
9See Proposition 10 in the Appendix for a formal statement of this result.
10Formally one can show this by defining T to be the time at which the first-best rule book is first
achieved and writing the Principal’s payoff as the expectation over T of the conditional expected payoff
given T .
11When two rules apply they give the same action so the priorities we specified were unimportant.
12This result relates to the literature on the necessary size of message spaces in implementation theory.
See for instance Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) and Segal (2010) and the references therein.
13When two rules apply they give the same action so the priorities we specified were unimportant.
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